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In this paper, I wish to discuss two problems. Firstly, I wish to discuss what transformation 
of the Japanese legal culture is desirable. Secondly, I wish to discuss how such trans-
formation could be brought about. These questions require me to review both the scholar-
ship and the practice.  
Stewart Macaulay wrote (Macaulay, 1992) that when Joel Handler went to Philadel-
phia in 1992 to give his presidential address at an annual meeting of the Law and Society 
Association and criticize postmodernist scholars for their disabling impacts on transforma-
tive politics (Handler, 1992), he rattled the cage. Handler actually rattled the cage strongly 
enough to produce a symposium in Law & Society Review and to make his successor, Sally 
Engle Merry, present her own vision of socio-legal studies and transformative movements 
in her presidential address (Merry, 1995). I would be happy if my paper had one tenth of 
that effect. This means that I will criticize some of the best and brightest of the socio-legal 
scholarship in both Japan and North America. 
II. THE “INTERPRETIVE TURN” IN STUDIES ON LEGAL CULTURE AND CONSCIOUSNESS 
Many recent works on legal culture and consciousness in English-speaking countries can 
be characterized as results of the “interpretive turn” in socio-legal studies (Harrington and 
Yngvesson, 1990). Among its various characteristics, the interpretive turn sees legal 
cultures both as a constraint and as a resource. A legal culture is a constraint when it sets a 
limit on the way people understand and respond to the reality. A legal culture is a resource 
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when it provides people with repertoires to express their interests. Therefore, a task for 
socio-legal studies is to describe how a culture works in specific situations and identify 
contingencies which affect the way a culture works. Such an interest requires scholars to 
focus on legal consciousness of actors in the given situation. What socio-legal scholars 
should do is observation of on-going social interactions, and identification of legal culture 
and consciousness through interpretation of observed interactions. 
III. MY OWN INTERPRETIVE TURN 
My own research method is participant observation and in-depth interview. It is fair to say 
that I am one of the very few Japanese socio-legal scholars who has actually carried out 
participant observation in a study of a legal institution (Miyazawa, 1992). Aaron V. 
Cicourel (1976) was my methodological inspiration.  
With that background, it was natural for me to make my own “interpretive turn” in my 
approach to legal culture. I made that turn at the 13th World Congress on Philosophy of 
Law and Social Philosophy which was held in the Kobe International Conference Hall on 
August 25, 1987. I was asked to participate as a discussant in a session entitled “Inter-
national Conflicts as Conflicts of Legal Cultures.”  
There I saw heads of legal departments of major Japanese corporations report their 
encounters with the American legal system, which makes it much easier than in Japan for 
consumers, employees, and competitors to legally challenge their business practices. They 
described how much they were shocked by such encounters, and opposed introduction of 
similar devices into Japan on the ground that they are against the Japanese legal culture. 
There I realized that culture was being used to justify a status quo which was advanta-
geous to them.  
So I wondered how I should frame my comment on their reports, and chose Clifford 
Geertz (1973; 1983), the anthropologist, as my guide. In short, culture is a mechanism of 
social control which makes people accept the dominant social arrangement as just and 
natural. What the heads of legal departments at the above-mentioned conference were 
saying was that the status quo of the Japanese legal system fit the common sense of the 
Japanese people, so that any element of the American legal system should not be intro-
duced. I presented a discussion paper entitled “How Does Culture Count?” which was 
later published in Japanese (Miyazawa, 1989).  
This conception of culture led me to my present interest in the analysis of the process 
in which a culture succeeds in dominating the situation in the contest of competing 
cultures. Of course, cultures do not behave by themselves. People mobilize, challenge, and 
transform cultures and, hence, social arrangements. The question is how people do so, and 
who succeeds in making their culture prevail in that situation.  
Therefore, we should not explain social relations by merely finding the culture which 
justifies these social relations, as is often done by those who invoke Japanese culture. This 
stagnates our discipline.  
We must go further and seek explanations of why the supporters of the dominant form 
of culture and social relations won in this contest of cultures, and why they have been able 
to maintain their domination. My theoretical strategy has been to seek that explanation in 
social stratification and unequal distribution of resources. Donald Black (1976) has been 
my theoretical inspiration in this regard.  
This conception of culture is different from more conventional interests in legal culture 
in Japan as a determinant of behaviors and institutions. So, I tentatively call myself a “neo-
culturalist.”  
From my perspective, analysis of encounters and transformations of legal cultures 
should take a bottom-up approach which starts from a micro level. Encounters of legal 
cultures would mean encounters of people with different legal cultures. Transformation of 
a legal culture would mean that the people in favor of particular culture prevailed in the 
contest of cultures fought by people representing different cultures. A macro-level trans-
formation of a legal culture would be conceived as an accumulation of the results of such 
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micro-level contests of legal cultures. From my perspective, there is no inherent reason to 
believe that the currently prevailing legal culture is the only culture we could have in 
Japan. To transform our society, we must first expose how it serves certain interests, and 
tear away its taken-for-granted-ness. Then, we must introduce a vision of a different 
culture which we could and should have in our society.  
So, how does my neo-culturalism differ from interpretism? Probably the most obvious 
difference is that I pay much attention to the impact of social structure and try to explain 
the domination of a certain culture in terms of the resources available to participants in the 
contest of cultures and consciousness. Interpretism stresses the need to abandon all kinds 
of dualism (Harrington and Yngvesson, 1990: 140). It would, therefore, deny the distinc-
tion between culture/consciousness and structure.  
I believe that such self-imposed limitations would impoverish both our scholarship and 
practice. Our experience in Japan has told us that contests of different cultures and con-
sciousness are often won by the side with more resources, and that disadvantaged parties 
have often been forced to withdraw from the contest or to compromise with a result far 
below what they initially expected. This is true whether or not the parties involved subjec-
tively perceive the existence of a social structure which limits or promotes their respective 
interests.  
IV. VISIONS FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF JAPANESE LEGAL CULTURE 
1. The Liberal Vision 
What is the currently dominant legal culture in Japan? How should it be transformed?  
For these questions, I wish to begin with a paper written by the legal philosopher 
Tatsuo Inoue, which is a most forceful and eloquent presentation of a position with which 
I feel much sympathy. Inoue presented this paper under the title of “The Poverty of 
Rights-Blind Communality: Looking Through the Window of Japan,” at a symposium on 
communitarianism where none other than Mary Ann Glendon was the general reporter 
(Inoue, 1993). While Inoue deals with general characteristics of Japanese society as a 
whole, legal culture is certainly a part of it.  
Inoue finds “an eloquent jurisprudential expression” in Glendon’s recent work, Rights 
Talk (Inoue, 1993: 526). When I read Glendon’s book (1991), I was struck by her in-
sensitivity to the process through which a community acquires its dominant culture, or 
“language of discourse,” which determines what “the virtue” (MacIntyre, 1984) is in the 
given community. It must be a result of a contest of different cultures fought by people 
with different resources. Therefore, from my neo-culturalist perspective, there is no reason 
to force every member of the community to accept the culture which happens to be occu-
pying a dominant status for the moment. Moreover, while she presents her belief in “the 
seedbeds of civic virtue” like “families, religious communities and other primary groups,” 
she is silent about the mechanism through which integration is attained among people who 
belong to different “families, religious communities and other primary groups,” namely 
the mechanism through which a broader society or country can reach a consensus on any 
significant issues. What she is saying toward the end of her book sounds to me like 
“America is blessed by God. If only we abandon rights and lawyers, a natural order will 
somehow emerge.” This must be politically popular under the current political climate in 
the United States, but, intellectually, this is sheer irresponsibility.  
In any event, Inoue presents a description of Japanese society as an epitome of com-
munitarianism. He believes that the salient characteristics of Japanese culture and society 
are close to what the “communitarian vision” is seeking. He argues that (Inoue, 1993: 
527-528):  
... the primacy of group loyalty ... results in a weak commitment to such universal 
principles as human rights, justice, and fairness. ... ... ... the vagueness of self-other 
differentiation, which implies the importance of human interdependence (amae), 
connection (en) and the mutual responsibility of caring (kikubari), is often ascribed to 
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the core of the Japanese view of the moral world. On the other hand, individual 
autonomy and rights consciousness (kenri ishiki), which presuppose a sharp self-other 
differentiation, are regarded as alien to this view. 
Inoue’s conclusion (1993: 550-551) is that:  
... the Japanese experience ... shows that ... [t]he closed community that neglects 
individual rights and absorbs its members’ personality also impoverishes our commu-
nal life, as well as our individuality. Adequately conceived individual rights based on 
universalism, a non-absolutist trump and a sense of the worth of individuality are the 
bases for a richer form of communality--namely, open communality. This form of 
communality activates and widens our sensitivity to the wide range of our communal 
responsibilities. In other words, individual rights can sustain the delicate equilibrium 
of various competing communalities by checking the overgrowth of each of them. In 
this sense, the tension between rights and community is indispensable to their recon-
ciliation. 
Before reaching this conclusion, Inoue takes up kaishashugi, or the ideology of total devo-
tion to the welfare of the company, for his diagnosis of Japanese society. Inoue argues that 
“[t]he dark side of Japan’s land of community is at least as dark as the dark side of 
America’s land of rights. As for Japan, there is now an urgent need to heed the voice that 
calls for increased respect for individual rights” (Inoue, 1993: 531). He illustrates this dark 
side of Japan by his analysis of karoshi or death by overwork as it symbolizes “the tension 
and distress of a hyperindustrialized and secularized communitarian society.”  
According to him, “Japanese society is basically an intricate web of various inter-
mediary communities,” which have the ability “to maintain their internal order by extra-
legal and informal sanctions.” “Each community ... tends to narrow and homogenize the 
members’ mental horizons and to apply the pervasive pressure of social tyranny on deviant 
individuals, who seek a form of life different from the community’s shared life-style” 
(Inoue, 1993: 539-540). He calls this the “tyranny of intermediary communities,” and 
presents several examples.  
Inoue declares that “individual rights are an endangered moral species in the land of 
community,” that “Japan’s moral infrastructure is worn out,” and that “society needs a 
moral reorientation which places a greater emphasis on individual rights” (Inoue, 1993: 
544-545).  
I agree with Inoue. In Japan, minorities are required to tolerate the intolerance of 
majority people. This requirement is enforced not only by informal community pressure, 
but also by governmental authorities, judiciary, employers, and all other conceivable 
agents of social control. Therefore, I do not agree, for instance, with John Braithwaite’s 
description of social control in Japan as “reintegrative” in his award-winning book, Crime, 
Shame and Reintegration (Braithwaite, 1989).  
Returning to more general issues, it is inevitable to mention the implications of the 
Emperor system for the development of respect for individuals. Norma Field’s In the 
Realm of a Dying Emperor (Field, 1993) provides a poignant description of case of the 
former mayor of Nagasaki who was shot when he publicly stated that the Showa Emperor 
was responsible for the war. Inoue forcefully discusses in another paper (Inoue, 1992) the 
incompatibility of the Emperor system and liberalism, which respects differences among 
people. 
On the other hand, there have been some promising signs for change even among 
members of the establishment. For instance, companies and other employers have finally 
realized the value of respecting the individualism of their employees when many of them 
asked their employers to give them leave to come to Kobe as volunteers to rescue and help 
quake victims. As a result, 1995 has been called “Year One” (gannen) for volunteers in 
Japan. 
This is another clear example of how respect for individual rights could contribute to 
the interests of a community which is even broader than actors’ immediate life sphere. It 
must be noted that extreme group loyalty has hindered development of the sense of caring 
for a wider community. 
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2. Japanese Critics of Rights 
I must note, however, that a quite different perspective has been presented recently by 
socio-legal scholars as a vision for the transformation of Japanese legal system. Their 
writings appear to be a combination of critical legal studies, postmodernism, and commun-
itarianism. 
Critical legal studies are cited to stress the hegemonic power of legal rights and the 
formal judicial system to limit the ways people can deal with their problems and express 
their own perspectives. Postmodernism is cited to argue that grand narratives or theories 
lost their effectiveness in the transformation of society, and that activist lawyers who 
impose their own grand narratives on their clients are exerting their hegemonic power, like 
that of legal rights and the formal judicial system. Communitarianism is cited to argue for 
the need to base our legal system on people’s natural sense of morality. 
They have also made various practical arguments. They emphasize negotiation, media-
tion and settlement, as opposed to formal adjudication (Wada, 1991). They emphasize 
prose litigation over representation by bengoshi or attorneys (Tanase, 1988). They empha-
size the role of shihô shoshi or judicial scriveners, as opposed to bengoshi (Wada, 1993). 
They emphasize that the bengoshi should totally immerse herself in the perspective of 
clients and should never impose her own legalistic perspectives (Tanase, 1995). 
The leading proponent of this perspective is Takao Tanase, who was said by a reviewer 
(Kaino, 1995: 219) to have caused a turning point in the recent socio-legal studies in 
Japan. He is very circumspect in his criticism of rights in Japan. He only says, for in-
stance, that while direct importation of negative views about legalization from the United 
States would simply ignore the differences in backgrounds of two societies, it is at least 
important to learn from the experience of other countries in anticipation of the inevitable 
legalization of Japanese society (Tanase, 1991: 68). However, judging from his affirma-
tive reference to Glendon’s works (Tanase, 1995) and his criticism of Kawashima’s 
modernist criticism of Japanese society (Tanase, 1993), it is fair to say that he is skeptical 
about the liberal perspective for the transformation of Japanese society in the direction of 
emphasizing the rights of individuals. 
His students are more candid. For instance, Masaki Abe (1994: 131) states that:  
Isn’t it true that in Japan as well, many people are too accustomed to understanding 
the relationship between themselves and others in terms of legal concepts of rights and 
duties, and have become insensitive to the possibility of other ways of understanding? 
How would Takeyoshi Kawashima respond to such a statement if he were alive and here? 
3. Hegemonic Power of the Legal System and Legal Culture 
The question is whether their criticism applies to the vision I have already presented.  
First of all, we cannot deny that many parts of the current Japanese legal system and 
the dominant legal culture are fundamentally based on individualistic concepts of rights in 
the context of capitalism. For instance, property rights, particularly land ownership, have 
been given almost sacred status by the central government and the judiciary in Japan. This 
situation makes it extremely difficult, for instance, to give local governments the authority 
for effective zoning and other land-use planning, or to expand the standing to sue to 
prevent pollution beyond those who own lands or have other clearly recognized rights.  
However, what we are emphasizing are new types of rights which are designed precise-
ly to challenge this hegemonic status of property rights. A good example is the kankyoken, 
or right to an unpolluted environment. This right has been constructed based on Arti-
cles 13 and 25 of the Constitution, which prescribe the people’s right to life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness, as well as their right to maintain the minimum standards of 
wholesome and cultured living. 
Other examples of newly proposed rights also challenge various aspects of the existing 
legal system and the dominant legal culture. Think about the right of patients to seek 
informed consent; the right of resident foreigners to participate in local politics; the legally 
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enforceable right of women to seek equal employment; the right of the accused to have 
free legal counsel before indictment; the rights of children in school and community; and 
the right of consumers to protect themselves from defective products. There is even a 
movement for the right of animals to protect themselves from cruel treatment or the risk of 
extinction. In fact, a law suit was filed in March 1995 in southern Japan on behalf of 
endangered species of rabbits and other animals to prevent destruction of their habitats. 
We can go on forever. These movements are not seeking to extend the hegemonic power 
of the present legal system and its culture, but to replace present system and culture. 
4. Participation and Negotiation as Solution 
Probably radical postmodernists in North America would oppose even these rights, since 
they seem to believe that any predetermined goals, standards, and values are hegemonic, 
so that everything should be left contingent on micro-level interactions. Allan Hutchin-
son’s response to Handler’s address (Hutchinson, 1992) is a straightforward example. 
Japanese postmodernists seem to share such a view to some extent. A good example is 
Tanase’s compact summary of his proposals for reforms of law enforcement and judicial 
systems (Tanase, 1991).  
(1)  The public should participate in the process in which administrative agencies deter-
mine their general enforcement policies.  
(2)  Reforms should be introduced to encourage private prosecution.  
(3)  Administrative regulation should be carried out in an indirect way in which only a 
target is given to the regulated business, so that regulated business has the discretion to 
determine the details of how the target is to be achieved. The public should participate in 
this enforcement process.  
(4)  Adversarial judicial proceedings should be reformed to emulate as much as 
possible the structure of autonomous negotiation outside the court, so that the parties will 
be able to bring their own visions about the desirable society into the judicial system. 
One problem with these proposals is that Tanase does not mention the fact that busi-
ness already enjoys almost monopolistic access to the legislative and administrative 
process (Miyazawa, 1994: 79-103). Both general targets and details of implementation are 
agreed upon between the regulator and regulated. His proposal could legitimate this situa-
tion. 
A more fundamental problem is that Tanase does not discuss the possibility that the 
people’s legal consciousness is limited by the hegemonic power of the dominant legal 
culture, so that simply bringing them into the administrative and judicial systems might 
not have any transformative impact. This problem has been illustrated by Shiro Kashi-
mura’s ethnomethodological study on labor negotiations in Japan (Kashimura, 1989). Not 
only management, but also the union does not perceive labor law as relevant to their 
negotiation. Since Tanase seems to reject activities by lawyers to provide alternative per-
spectives to the parties, on the grounds that they are an exercise of hegemonic power, I am 
afraid that his reforms would simply reproduce the status quo and please the establish-
ment, unless they are coupled with strong measures to correct imbalances in resources 
between the parties, including active legal assistance, which he is likely to oppose. 
On the other hand, his reforms certainly require the establishment of new legally-
enforceable procedural rights. They can be easily incorporated into our vision. 
The next issue is whether procedural rights are enough. Since Tanase rejects the pater-
nalistic involvement of lawyers in the disputing process, those who have the resources and 
capabilities to explore all conceivable issues which could affect their interests, to survive 
lengthy negotiation processes, or to force the other side to accept their terms, would enjoy 
advantage. 
Here is a great disagreement about the role of substantive rights between us. I believe 
that his reform proposals implicitly assume equally resourceful actors. I believe that such 
an assumption is totally unrealistic and unfounded. 
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5. Priority in Japanese Society 
The final question is which is our more pressing problem between the following two:     
the danger of becoming like the United States or the danger of remaining a rights-blind 
society. I believe that it is highly unrealistic to argue that there is an imminent danger of a 
tyranny of rights and lawyers in Japan. One obvious factor is the enormous difference in 
the number of lawyers between Japan and other developed countries. There are other 
factors as well.  
Firstly, unlike the judiciary in the United States, the Japanese judiciary is not likely to 
give absolute nature to rights because our Constitution has clauses about public-welfare 
limitations. For instance, Article 13 provides that “the people[‘s] ... right to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public 
welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs.” 
Secondly, the judiciary has been extremely reluctant to apply the Constitution and hold 
unconstitutional any governmental policies, and judges are closely controlled to conform 
with this policy (Miyazawa, 1991; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993).  
Thirdly, it is an established fact that whenever a new dispute processing mechanism 
was required, the government always tried and succeeded to establish it as a mediation or 
other non- judicial proceeding under its control. Frank Upham wrote a classic on this 
subject (Upham, 1987). This pattern still continues. 
For instance, 1995 is the 10th anniversary of the implementation of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act (Danjo Koyô Kikai Kintô Hô). However, it is hardly a celebration. 
There are serious problems with both substantive clauses and the dispute processing 
system. Substantively, equal treatment is not a legally enforceable duty, but a target for 
effort (doryoku mokuhyô) of the employer. As a result, under the current unfavorable 
economic environment, employers have returned to earlier practices. 
Procedurally, in addition to the regular judicial system, a mediation proceeding was 
also introduced as a much speedier mechanism. However, in order to use it, the plaintiff 
must obtain the consent of the employer and the approval of a Labor Ministry official. 
Therefore, applications have been filed against only 11 companies: two applications were 
rejected by companies; eight applications were rejected by the Ministry. Only one case 
reached a recommendation, which was unacceptable to the plaintiffs. The official who 
handled this case said that “They expected a mediation which is very close to adjudica-
tion,” but “a mediation is not a place to decide right or wrong” (Yomiuri Shinbun, 1995). 
On August 9, 1995, nine women employees of three companies of the Sumitomo group, 
including the plaintiffs of this mediation case, filed formal law suits against their em-
ployers to seek wages lost by discrimination and damage awards for their psychological 
distress. Two of them even sought damage awards from the government for its refusal of 
their petition for a mediation.  
Another example is the plight of uncertified victims of mercury poisoning (Minamata 
disease) by water pollution. Initial law suits produced an administrative system to certify 
victims so that they can receive compensation. However, the certification system was 
administered so restrictively that the second wave of Minamata litigations started around 
1970. The cases are still pending in three high courts and five district courts, while the 
courts have been recommending settlement to the parties. The polluting company and the 
local government have agreed to settle, but the central government has refused. Not until 
June 20, 1995 has the coalition government decided to expand the range of uncertified 
victims to receive compensation, on the condition that the settlement will not include 
admission of the legal responsibility of the government. 
I can add many other examples. Under these circumstances, it should be obvious that 
there is no imminent danger of having a tyranny of absolute rights in Japanese society. On 
the contrary, we need more rights to escape from the tyranny of communities.  
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V. AGENTS OF TRANSFORMATION 
I hope that I have presented a persuasive argument for the necessity of a liberal transfor-
mation of the Japanese legal culture and legal system. The next question is the agent for 
such transformative politics. As I have stated when I explained my own interpretive turn, 
we must find them among ordinary people. 
Among postmodernist scholars, for instance, Austin Sarat (1990) presents “a story of a 
woman who refuses to cooperate with her welfare attorney,” and Patricia Ewick and Susan 
Silbey (1992) present a story of “a black domestic worker who gloats that the unjust 
punishment she has received from the court is in fact no imposition on her life.” While 
these authors accord much significance to these stories for their transformative potentials, 
Handler (1992) is not impressed. “While these moments” may be “often cathartic for the 
individuals involved,” they “mark no more than a small break in a world of despair and 
marginality.” 
To add my favorite quotation from Handler, he said that: 
James Scott (1990), in his book on protest below, starts with an Ethiopian proverb: 
“When the great lord passes, the wise peasant bows deeply and silently farts.” 
Progressive forces need trumpets, not farts. (Handler, 1992: 746). 
I liked this sentence because, in Japan, there is a word often used by the establishment 
when they realized potentially dangerous complaints among their subordinates. For in-
stance, when a dean of a law faculty sensed a hidden opposition to his agenda, he would 
say to his aid: “gasunuki shiyô” or “let’s let the gas out.” Opposing faculty members 
would be allowed to express their unhappiness about the proposal at a faculty meeting, but 
a decision would nonetheless be made according to the dean’s plan. A wise ruler knows 
how to allow her subordinates to privately ridicule her if it serves to maintain the order. 
In fact, I had the feeling when I read these works of postmodernist scholars that they 
believe that the wall of the establishment will somehow collapse without actually touching 
it. In that sense, they seem to be extremely optimistic. Perhaps they can afford to be 
optimistic in the United States where judiciary or other governmental agencies are less 
bureaucratic and less tightly controlled internally, so that it may be relatively easier to 
form a coalition with insiders. However, we cannot be that optimistic in Japan where 
everything is so tightly organized and so tightly controlled. For instance, a Japanese court 
would never fail to confiscate the nullified driver’s license of the black woman described 
by Ewick and Silbey.  
Moreover, they seem to be giving too much significance to individual, unrecognized 
resistance, against their own methodological tenet. When they declare that these cases of 
resistance are potentially transformative, they are certainly evaluating them from a more 
general, abstract perspective. However, does this not violate one of their most fundamental 
tenets that we must abandon grand narratives? As Merry said (1995: 13), postmodernists 
believe that “no group is authorized to construct for others a vision of a socially just 
world.” Of course, they can argue that their ascription of significance to these cases is 
truly postmodernist, namely, totally ad hoc, contingent, and malleable. If so, they are poli-
tically irresponsible.  
These are the reasons why I am interested in Merry’s discussion in her presidential 
address (1995). She presents three examples of resistance in and through law. The point is 
that each of them “foregrounds the way law contributes to enhancing the power of sub-
ordinates through processes of cultural redefinition.” 
Before commenting on her stories, however, I should discuss Merry’s major work, 
Getting Justice and Getting Even (Merry, 1990). The story is about the legal behavior of 
working-class people in two Massachusetts towns. They bring neighborhood or family 
matters to the court, where court officials might refuse to accept on the grounds that these 
matters are better handled outside the court. The theoretical point she makes is a paradox 
that while law can be a powerful weapon even for working-class people, there is also a 
danger for them of losing control over their cases to court officials. Therefore, law is both 
enabling and disabling. 
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One question I felt from this study was whether law was really disabling. After all, 
those people could always handle their problems informally. We can say that law simply 
provided an additional repertoire. 
But more fundamental questions arose when I read the final chapter of the book, which 
provided a historical background for the legal consciousness of working-class people that 
they are entitled to have access to the court. This consciousness is said to have developed 
as a result of a series of legal rights activism which “affected the poor and unrepresented 
themselves, suggesting to them the possibility of seeking the court’s help in dealing with 
their problems” (Merry, 1990: 177). I had two questions. Firstly, after a painstaking, 
micro-level description of legal consciousness and behavior which involve subtle differ-
ences among working-class people, suddenly a macro-level characterization of the legal 
consciousness of working-class Americans as a whole appears. Is this consistent with a 
methodological position which stresses the primacy of micro-level observation? Secondly, 
if her description of the historical background is correct, is not it a social movement with a 
grand narrative that really counts? 
Returning to Merry’s presidential address, her third case is most interesting to me. She 
characterizes it as resistance which redefines the meaning of law. 
The People’s International Tribunal was held in Hawai’i in the summer of 1993 to put 
the United States on trial for its takeover of the sovereign nation of Hawai’i and its acts of 
resource appropriation and cultural destruction to the Native Hawaiian people. The 
tribunal took the form of a criminal trial, and the complaint was sent to the United States, 
which did not appear and was represented by an empty chair during the trial. The judges 
represented the community of international indigenous rights groups and scholars. The 
verdict was based on the five principles of law (Merry, 1995: 22): 
(1) Kanaka Maoli law  
(2) International law  
(3) The Constitution of the United States, other federal and state laws, and federal and 
state judicial decisions  
(4) The Law of Peoples as Nations  
(5) The Inherent Law of Humanity 
Thus, this case represents an exercise of legal pluralism by which “the law of the nation is 
nested between indigenous law and global human rights law” (Merry, 1995: 21). Merry 
concludes this case by saying that “[i]f we see law as constituted by social practices and 
meanings, such movements have larger implications for law itself” (Merry, 1995: 23).       
I agree. However, must we become postmodernists in order to understand the transforma-
tive potentiality of this movement? 
In any event, she concludes her presidential address by emphasizing “the importance of 
research on the cultural meanings produced by law in the habitual, possibly resistant, 
practices of everyday life as well as through major social movements” (Merry, 1995: 25). 
No one would disagree. However, must we become postmodernists to agree with this 
conclusion? 
Reading Merry’s presidential address this way, my position is probably very close to 
that of Michael McCann’s Rights at Work (1994). Reliance on laws, rights, lawyers, 
organizations, and grand narratives is inherently neither enabling, nor disabling. They are 
simply resources for the actors, and their impacts are contingent upon the concrete condi-
tions of and around the actors. While existing laws and rights certainly have limitations, 
their innovative use can still enhance the position of the actors, although the pace of the 
progress may be slower than desired. Having a long-term strategy does not preclude short-
term tactics which fit the given situation. Indeed, a long-term strategy may be indispen-
sable in order for the actors to perceive the significance of their small, tactical victory, so 
that they will not be frustrated by the difference between their ultimate goal and their 
limited success at any given moment. 
When Stuart Scheingold came to Kobe soon after the quake on January 17, 1995, and 
interviewed with me activist lawyers in Osaka, Kyoto, and Tokyo, he was surprised by 
their lack of cynicism and their political versatility. Probably because there has never been 
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the “myth of rights” (Scheingold, 1974) in Japan, these lawyers have anticipated a 
tremendous gap between what they aspire to, and what they can realistically expect. 
Moreover, since there is little prospect of achieving anything significant through formal 
judicial proceedings, they have by necessity expanded their repertoires to include extra-
judicial activities. In this sense, it is contrary to the reality in Japan to say that the 
involvement of activist lawyers mean the imposition of their legalistic perspective over the 
will of the party. 
Therefore, in the final section of my paper, I wish to present a case of a transformative 
movement which utilizes not only indigenous ethnic concepts, but also local governments, 
national laws, and international human rights instruments in its effort to challenge the 
central government and its law. 
VI. A STORY OF A TRANSFORMATIVE MOVEMENT IN JAPAN 
I would like to tell a story about a movement which challenges not only tacit assumptions 
of Japanese constitutional scholarship, but also one of the most prevailing myths about 
Japanese society, namely the myth that there is no ethnic minority in Japanese citizens. 
That is the movement of Ainu people to establish the right of indigenous people 
(senjûken). 
The Ainu are an ethnic group who are ethnically different from the Yamato, the ethnic 
majority of Japanese population. They used to live throughout eastern Japan. As the 
Yamato gradually expanded their political control over Honshu, the main island of Japan, 
the Ainu were pushed eastward, and were finally expelled to the island of Ezo, which is 
now called Hokkaidô. Their estimated number is approximately 25,000. 
The Japanese government changed the name of Ezo to Hokkaidô in 1869 and granted 
the citizenship to Ainu in 1870 (Hokkaidô Shinbun Shakaibu, 1991). In 1877, the govern-
ment declared lands occupied by Ainu as lands without owners and confiscated them into 
the state-owned lands. At the same time, the government prohibited the use of the Ainu 
language and Ainu customs such as tattooing. The government forced the Ainu to adopt 
Japanese names, while it registered them in civil registers (koseki) as former aborigines 
(kyû dojin). In 1889, the government enacted a law called Kyû Dojin Hogo Hô or the Law 
for the Protection of Former Aborigines. 
This law provided that the prefectural government may grant land of up to 50,000 
square meters free of charge to Ainu who wish to engage in farming. However, since the 
governor of the prefecture lost the authority over state-owned lands by legislation after the 
war, this provision has no effect now. However, if an Ainu was granted a free land by the 
government when the law was effective, it is still prohibited to trade that land without the 
consent of the governor. Ainu consider this law as a symbol of their discrimination. 
The Hokkaidô Utari Association, the Ainu organization which covers Hokkaidô as a 
whole, decided in 1982 to seek abolition of the law and enactment of a new law. The asso-
ciation also declared that Ainu have the right of indigenous people over Hokkaidô and the 
southern four islands of the Kuril Islands. In 1983, a socialist governor was elected in 
Hokkaidô who supported the proposal of the association. In 1984, the association drafted a 
new law. It contained, among other demands, a demand for the establishment of special 
seats in both the National Diet and the prefectural legislature. In the same year, the 
Hokkaidô prefectural government established a committee to discuss the content of the 
proposed law. 
In 1989, the Utari Association organized demonstrations in Hokkaidô and held its first 
meeting in Tokyo. The central government established a committee to study the proposal 
with representatives from governmental ministries, which held its first meeting in 1990. 
In the election of the Upper House of the National Diet in 1992, the Socialist Party 
included a leader of the Utari Association among its candidates for proportional represen-
tation. He ended as a runner-up that time, but later became a member of the Diet by filling 
a vacancy.  
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There is opposition among Ainu to the proposal of a new law. Some left the Utari Asso-
ciation stating that they wanted to live as Japanese. Others believe that special treatment 
will simply create new discrimination. The central government is still reluctant to enact 
the law. The socialist governor left office, and the Socialist Party lost badly in the most 
recent election. Nevertheless, the movement continues, and it shows remarkable versatility 
in mobilizing both legal and political instruments. 
The basis of their demand is their desire to maintain their cultural traditions and ethnic 
identity. They try to utilize the Japanese Constitution, particularly Article 13 (the right to 
pursue happiness), Article 14 (equality before the law), and Article 25 (the right to healthy 
and cultured life). The point is that with their independent ethnic identity, Ainu are entitled 
to pursue their happiness in their own way, but are still entitled to enjoy equal treatment 
before the law while keeping their ethnic identity. 
Recently they have been trying to utilize international human rights documents. Article 
29 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Japan ratified in 
1979, provides that “[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community 
with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice 
their own religion, or to use their own language.” The Utari Association has been active in 
the UN Human Rights Committee. Potentially, international law could be a most effective 
weapon because Article 98 of the Japanese Constitution requires the country to abide by 
the ratified international treaties and established internal law. In fact, the utilization of 
international human rights documents is a common strategy of various social movements 
in Japan, ranging from the right of the accused, to the right of Asian women who were 
forced to serve Japanese army as its sex slaves. This is because domestic law is usually 
hostile to their demands, and because they often lack access to legislative, administrative, 
and judicial processes in Japan. 
Takashi Ebashi, the constitutional scholar, writes about the transformative implications 
of the proposed law for both the legal system and the constitutional scholarship (Ebashi, 
1991). He particularly discusses some “widely accepted views” (jôshiki) which have 
dominated the constitutional scholarship. We might call these views a hegemonic aspect of 
the prevailing legal culture. 
Firstly, previous constitutional scholarship has widely accepted the concept of reason-
able discrimination in regard to the equal treatment clause of Article 14. The constitutional 
scholarship has been content with the lack of formal discrimination by law, and has rarely 
discussed the necessity of affirmative actions to correct discrimination in various aspects 
of politics, economy, and social life. 
Secondly, the constitutional scholarship has no notion that Japanese citizens could be 
divided into several ethnic groups. Hence, it cannot understand why a certain group should 
receive special rights. 
Ebashi, then, discusses the implications of the proposed right of indigenous people 
being defined as a right of a group. First of all, the Japanese Constitution is clearly an 
individualistic constitution, as its Article 13 requires respect for individual rights. There-
fore, if the proposed group right was enacted, the right of individual members of Ainu to 
leave the group would have to be guaranteed. 
The second issue of the proposed right of indigenous people is that it includes entitle-
ment to lands and resources. In order to recognize such an entitlement, we must recognize 
the following two doctrines: firstly, healthy and cultured life for Ainu means the life 
according to Ainu culture; secondly, the survival of Ainu depends on access to lands and 
resources which used to be their own. These doctrines would require a reinterpretation of 
Article 25 of the Constitution about the right to healthy and cultured life, which has been 
interpreted from the perspective of the Yamato way of life based on farming and, more 
recently, from the perspective of an industrialized, urbanized society. 
The third issue about the right of indigenous people is the claim for self-determination 
or a special right to participate in politics. This strongly clashes with prevailing views in 
constitutional scholarship. The constitutional scholarship so far has paid much attention to 
the equality of the right to participate in politics, so that, for instance, apportionment has 
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been a dominant issue. However, several other countries have already faced the problem 
of the effective political participation of ethnic minorities. In light of that, Ebashi says, it 
is utterly amazing that the Japanese constitutional scholarship rejects it without discus-
sion. 
VII. CONCLUSION  
It is difficult to predict whether and how a new law for Ainu will be enacted. However, as 
you can see easily in the media these days, resident foreigners, disabled people, women, 
and various other groups of people are demanding equal opportunities to pursue their 
lives. This requires us to develop a radically different conception of Japanese society 
which is free from the myth of homogeneous community. We must aspire to a society 
where people with different resources are guaranteed equal access to the democratic 
process, so that consensus is pursued through reasoned discussions. We need more rights 
to realize such a society. 
Such a liberal transformation of Japanese legal culture and institutions requires a 
movement of citizens who mobilize lawyers and other intellectuals as well as other 
resources. They must both be idealistic in holding a grand narrative as their long- term 
goal, and realistic in adopting tactics which fit local conditions. 





* This paper is a slightly revised version of the paper “Taking Merry Seriously: A Neo-culturalist 
Review of the Recent Scholarship and Practice in Japan,” which the author presented at the 
Plenary Meeting 2 “Legal Culture: Encounters and Transformations” of the 1995 Annual 
Meeting of the Research Committee on Sociology of Law of the International Sociological 
Association, on August 3, 1995, at the Yasuda Auditorium Building of the University of Tokyo. 
The original full paper was twice as long, but an abridged version was used for the oral presen-
tation. 
  The author gratefully acknowledges that Professors Taro Kitagamae and Teruki Tsunemoto 
kindly provided information about publications about the Ainu movement. The author regrets 
that only a small portion of it is used in this paper. Professor Masaki Abe, then at the University 
of Wisconsin Law School, kindly photocopied journal articles and purchased books which were 
not available at Kobe University Library. Dwight Van Winkle, a J.S.D. candidate at Kobe Uni-
versity and a J.D. student at the University of Washington, helped the author polish his English. 
He had only a few hours to work on the original full paper. Finally, but not least, the author is 
grateful to Dr. Harald Baum for unearthing the original paper in the conference proceedings. 
** Anmerkung der Redaktion: Die vorliegende Fassung des Beitrages ist zuerst erschienen in der 
Kobe University Law Review Nr. 29 (1995) S. 45-64. Wir danken Herausgebern und Redaktion 
herzlich für die großzügige Erlaubnis zum Zweitabdruck an dieser Stelle. Transkription und 
Zitierweise des Orginalbeitrages wurden beibehalten, weichen allerdings in Teilen von der sons-
tigen Übung der ZJapanR ab. Der im Text angesprochene Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
ist seit Erscheinen des Beitrages novelliert worden; die Minamata-Verfahren konnten abge-
schlossen werden, und das im Text als Entwurf erwähnte neue Gesetz über die Ainu ist zwischen-
zeitlich verabschiedet und in Kraft getreten. 
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